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NASA’s Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organizations assure the safety and 
enhance the success of all NASA activities. The purpose of this report is to explore how S&MA 
can adjust to a fundamental shift occurring in many areas of Systems Engineering (SE), the shift 
to “Model Based Systems Engineering” (MBSE). In this shift, much of the information that 
underpins SE is being organized and represented in models: carefully crafted rigorous 
computer-based representations of information, which collectively make SE activities easier to 
perform, less error prone, and scalable. Motivating this is the need to deal with ever larger and 
more complex systems. MBSE is perceived as key if these systems are to be developed in a 
cost-effective manner without sacrificing performance, reliability and safety. This shift is 
especially pertinent to NASA, given its ambitious mission expectations driving the need for novel 
and increasingly complex systems with very small production volumes. 
As SE practices shift to MBSE, S&MA practices must adjust accordingly – hence the term 
“Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA).” To understand the adjustments that will be needed, 
this report turns to OSMA’s recently developed “Objective Structure Hierarchies.” As stated on 
the OSMA web page [NASA OSMA, 2014] introducing them: 
“…the hierarchies provide a consistent way to describe the technical considerations 
behind existing standards in a consistent manner. By focusing on objectives, OSMA hopes 
that the new standards will be more flexible, agile and cost-effective, and will allow more 
ingenuity to achieve objectives. It will serve as a guide to help programs and projects plan 
how they will meet their objectives, instead of dictating what they must do to via prescriptive 
requirements.”  
The standards’ objectives will remain constant, while the S&MA practices (activities, 
processes, tools) to achieve those objectives are subject to change as the shift to MBSE takes 
place. Some existing practices may become less relevant or even obsolete; some may become 
much easier, faster, and/or increasingly applicable; some may require adjustment to most 
effectively operate; in addition, some new S&MA practices may become necessary to develop 
and apply. 
Brief introductory material on MBSE is provided for readers unfamiliar with the topic, to 
provide them context sufficient for them to appreciate the remainder of the document.   As 
MBSE is an emerging technology, there are a variety of disparate efforts underway at various 
organizations.  A significant emphasis of this study was to identify these efforts and possible 
implications for NASA’s future MBMA efforts. The bulk of the report presents insights derived 
from literature studies and interviews: 
 Literature studies were focused on published reports and presentations drawn from, 
predominantly, space-related applications of MBSE. They were examined for what they 
had to say on MBSE’s implications for assurance. Included herein are summaries of these 
points, illustrated with fragments from, and references to, the literature sources. 
 Interviews and discussions were conducted with knowledgeable S&MA and MBSE 
personnel. Again, the focus was to discover their concerns and ideas for MBSE’s 
implications for assurance.  Many of the interviews were with people involved, or soon to 
be involved, with the ongoing application of MBSE techniques on NASA’s Europa Clipper 
pre-project, the first large-scale NASA flight project to take this approach to SE. 
Preliminary findings and observations are presented on the state of practice of S&MA with 
respect to MBSE, how it is already changing, and how it is likely to change further. Finally, 




1.1 The emergence of MBSE 
NASA has developed the ability to successfully accomplish very difficult missions in 
hazardous conditions with high reliability, typically with very small production volumes (often 1).  
This stands as one of NASA’s great accomplishments and contributions to the aerospace 
industry.  It has been achieved through the use of a variety of processes, standards, reviews 
and other checkpoints.  Recognition of the need for many of these activities, and the artifacts 
they require in the course of project development, resulted from (often) painful lessons learned 
along the way.  Even the Systems Engineering V developed in the 1960s (for a history of the 
model, see Appendix B, “The V-Model” in [Weilkiens et al., 2015]) was motivated by the need to 
better organize the process of design and development. Over time NASA has honed its systems 
engineering processes to produce and use a cross-referenced set of documents. These 
documents both guide the system’s development, and inform S&MA assessments of that 
development. However, some of these processes can be imperfect.  Thus, yet more documents 
and processes are used to keep track of some of the original data, and document trees are 
established to ensure that each process is using data from the latest set of documents.  
Unfortunately, these processes become quite laborious, and errors creep in and sometimes 
escape detection despite them. When one document references information in another (or even 
duplicates that information), change management is difficult, error-prone and costly. Reviews 
often must scrutinize consistency within and among documents to attempt to eradicate errors. In 
an effort to improve upon this situation, various Information Technology solutions have been 
deployed, using documents, spreadsheets and databases at their heart to store and track 
information.  In the late 1990s this led to various requirements tools; these were, at their core, 
electronic document-based systems.  NASA projects and programs currently use a mix of 
paper, spreadsheets and other products, all carefully managed through PDMS/CM systems.  
This approach (mostly) works but it is unclear whether and how it will scale to future missions 
and their ever more complex systems. 
Systems Engineers have been at the center of this challenging situation, and many have job 
functions primarily focused on data consistency.  They were thus, in hindsight, naturally the first 
to see the value of Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) approaches.  Data itself must be 
both consistent and used in a consistent manner if the products derived from that data are in 
turn to be consistent.  MBSE addresses this. MBSE is at its heart about data and 
relationships.  For example, when one team wants the mass of a component, another wants 
the power draw of that component, and yet another wants the name of the vendor who supplied 
the component, there is no need to make three separate documents to capture that information.  
Instead in MBSE there is one underlying source of data (the model) and various users can 
interrogate that model to extract the subset of information that they need.  They do this by 
establishing viewpoints and views tailored to their particular needs:   
“A viewpoint describes the point of view of a set of stakeholders by framing their 
concerns along with the method for constructing an artifact (e.g., a set of slides in 
PowerPoint, a PDF file, a Word document, a web viewable format, etc.) that addresses 
those concerns. The view specifies the model content that is to be presented to the 
stakeholder in the artifact.” [Friedenthal et al., 2015] 
Because all these viewpoints are looking at the same underlying data model, the information 
they extract is self-consistent.  Many of our historical engineering problems would have been 
solved by just this breakthrough alone, but MBSE has much more to offer than just a single 
source of data.  MBSE seeks to organize and model all of the information pertaining to a system 
and its development.  To do so, an MBSE model includes objects, properties of those objects, 
and relationships among objects. This desire is easy to state, but in practice this is where 
careful preparations are necessary. To pave the way for modeling, it is necessary to establish 
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clear common definitions of terms and notions, the properties or relationships they have, and 
how they connect.    
MBSE’s model (which may be structured as a coordinated federation of models that 
together behave as one) is now the single authoritative source of data.  References to data are 
explicit, so when it is changed, all the places that reference it see that change.  Relationships 
between data are explicit, which reduces errors and enables automated checking of models to 
detect (and so prompt the correction of) many of the errors to which document-based 
engineering are prone. 
Interest in and adoption of MBSE spans many engineering sectors. This is evident from the 
variety of organizations listed in Figure 1, below, taken from opening remarks at the NASA/JPL 
Symposium & Workshop on Model-Based Systems Engineering. 
 
Figure 1 – Attendees’ organizations list from 2015 NASA/JPL Symposium and 
Workshop on MBSE. Reprinted from C. Lin, R. Fradet & D. Dvorak, “NASA/JPL Symposium & 
Workshop on Model-Based Systems Engineering,” January 2015, with the permission of the 
authors. (The workshop’s presentations are available from 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0B3hsmXWocH2JZVpTSzdzaUxYQzA) 
1.2 Mission Assurance and MBSE 
This document focuses on integrating the roles and disciplines of mission assurance into the 
practice of MBSE for NASA’s space mission purposes. The same factors that drive NASA’s 
interest in MBSE in general – the need to manage and execute the design, development and 
operation of ever-more complex mission-critical systems – clearly apply to the Aerospace and 
Defense arena and the commercial entities in the industrial sectors that support them. What 
distinguishes NASA’s space activities from most (admittedly not all) of those other areas is 
NASA’s need to do one-of-a-kind missions in relatively unexplored and unknown environments. 
Furthermore, in many of its missions NASA is involved throughout the lifecycle, from 
establishing the science requirements and mission concepts that will achieve them all the way 
through to operation and decommissioning. It is in this challenging context that NASA’s mission 
assurance practices take place. The high visibility of NASA’s endeavors places a premium on 
mission assurance, not only with the safety of NASA’s astronauts and workforce, but also with 
the successful accomplishment of mission objectives by billion+ dollar assets. 
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1.3 Organization of this report 
From here on the report is organized as follows: 
Section 2 “MBSE and MBMA – key factors” first summarizes the area of knowledge 
representation that forms the foundation of MBSE: the notion of an “ontology” is explained, its 
realization in the widely adopted systems engineering language SysML is discussed, and the 
(non-trivial) organization and development of an ontology for space systems engineering is 
outlined. This section then goes on to summarize OSMA’s “Objective Hierarchies”, introduced to 
become guidance to help OSMA practitioners focus on the “what” they are trying to achieve 
without having the “how” dictated. The Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Objective Hierarchy 
in particular is used in this report to organize and show where MBSE contributes to various 
areas of Mission Assurance. 
Section 3 “MBSE’s implications for MBMA” introduces and summarizes seven areas of 
MBSE influences on Mission Assurance. These were derived from a survey of the MBSE 
literature, with a particular focus on how MBSE might affect Mission Assurance of space 
systems. This section uses the aforementioned R&M Objectives Hierarchy to show the nature of 
those influences. 
Section 4 “MBMA details found in the MBSE literature” presents the detailed results of 
our literature survey. Numerous references to MBSE applications of space systems engineering 
are provided. The key points are illustrated with example portions taken from the literature. 
Section 5 “
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Observations derived from stakeholder interviews” covers those insights that arose from 
interviews with stakeholders in the MBSE and S&MA communities. 
Section 6 “Primary findings / observations” distills the aforementioned details and 
observations into the primary findings related to S&MA.  
Section 7 “Recommendations” follows. 
“Appendixes” conclude this report, covering Stakeholder Interviews, The Reliability and 
Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy, Acronyms, and References. 
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2 MBSE and MBMA – key factors 
2.1 Information representation in MBSE 
One of the cornerstones to achieving MBSE’s goals is the development of a complete and 
correct way of representing information in models. This provides the semantic underpinnings of 
models.  Done right, it enables much of the power of computer science to be applicable, 
including automated checking of models to determine whether various elements are complete, 
inconsistent or ambiguous.  It also enables reasoning and sophisticated searches (“queries” in 
the lexicon of computer science).  Machines can traverse the model to answer questions such 
as:  
Show all functions performed by components that consume power made by vendor X.  
Check that there are no functions lacking a corresponding component to perform them. 
As updates are made to models, they can be checked for simple well-formedness criteria. 
Comprehensive checks of the model as a whole may take significant time to execute. For large 
models with many objects and relationships, as would be the case for complex engineering 
projects, a good approach would be to run these overnight on a snapshot of the model. The 
results would then be relevant the next morning (on the assumption that little or no change to 
the model occurs overnight). 
. Ontology is the most appropriate term for this kind of information representation: 
 “In computer science and information science, an ontology is a formal naming and 
definition of the types, properties, and interrelationships of the entities that really or 
fundamentally exist for a particular domain of discourse.”  [Wikipedia: Ontology (Information 
Science)] 
Thus, a well-crafted ontology not only enables one to capture the various objects (e.g., 
components, functions, requirements, schedule elements), it also enables one to: express 
relationships between them (e.g., performed by, delivered by, identified by); apply additional 
constraints (e.g., total system mass shall be less than the margined available payload manifest 
mass); setup user-oriented views of the underlying model/ontology; and do reasoning upon this 
model.  It is this precision of information that enables many of the MBSE benefits.  As an 
alternative to “ontology,” the related term “meta-model” is seen in some of the MBSE literature.  
Note the potential for an unfortunate misunderstanding of the word “ontology”. This may 
stem from confusion caused by an alternate online definition (one not specific to computer and 
information science), namely: 
“Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence, or 
reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations.” [Wikipedia: Ontology]   
This definition sounds very esoteric and open-ended, and frankly useless for engineers!  
The notion of relationships as distinct from the objects being related is also key to 
understanding MBSE. For example: 
 Components (objects) perform (relationship) Functions (objects).  Furthermore, this 
“perform” relationship is an object in its own right and may have properties of its own.  The 
reverse “performed by” relationship relates Functions to Components.   
 Components can be “delivered by” a Responsible party, but Functions do not have the 
"delivered by” relationship to Responsible parties as it would not make sense.   
Thus, models can be automatically checked for missing relationships, for misconnected 
relationships, and for other well-formedness properties. As mentioned earlier, some checking 
can be run incrementally, and whole-model checks run in overnight batch mode.  
More fundamentally, the ontology itself can be checked for axioms of completeness, 
consistency and rules of good practice. Advances in the field of knowledge representation, for 
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example the Web Ontology Language (OWL) – see https://www.w3.org/2001/sw/wiki/OWL – 
and associated toolsets, provide support for this kind of checking. This need only be done if and 
when the ontology itself is changed. 
2.2 SysML 
A significant portion of the MBSE community has coalesced around a common standard for 
information modeling, the Systems Modeling Language (SysML™) [SysML]. In the early years it 
was nurtured by individual heroics of a few, and support from volunteer organizations such as 
INCOSE and OMG™.  In recent years, support for SysML has blossomed. There are a number 
of books (e.g., [Friedenthal et al., 2015]) and introductory courses for achieving familiarity and 
competence with SysML, and software tools that support development of models in the SysML 
language. 
The SysML language is designed for representing systems engineering information. It is an 
outgrowth of an earlier language, the Unified Modeling Language (UML), which was developed 
to be a standard language for software engineering. SysML adds constructs appropriate to 
systems engineering not already found in UML.  
SysML is designed to be a general-purpose systems engineering language, but in order to 
accommodate domain-specific needs, SysML is extensible (in fact, SysML is itself is an 
extension of UML). This capability is key. Concepts appropriate for a particular engineering 
discipline can, and should, be defined. These allow the ideal representation of information in 
that engineering discipline. For example, space systems engineering concepts of “mission”, 
“science objective”, “work package” etc. are not present in out-of-the-box SysML, but can be 
defined using its extension mechanism. SysML thus gives us the means to represent an 
ontology – its terminology, and associated properties and relationships. Done well, this will 
permit succinct and intuitive representation of information, while preventing misuse of properties 
and relationships. For example, in the context of space missions it makes sense for science 
objectives to be directly related to a mission, but not to a work package.  
2.3 Developing an ontology for space systems engineering 
Most pilot applications of MBSE across NASA have adopted SysML as the modeling 
language they use. They all then have the same need to develop an ontology appropriate for 
space systems engineering. This is critical if NASA is to effectively apply MBSE.  
Ontology development is inevitably done in an evolutionary manner, using discussions with 
experts and experiences of applying it to space systems’ engineering information to guide its 
expansion and revision (as and when found to be necessary). Significant efforts towards this 
end are underway within JPL and in the broader INCOSE community: 
 JPL: Around 2011, JPL stood up the Integrated Model-Centric Engineering (IMCE) 
office. For the first several years (with modest funding) this office began the task of 
developing an ontology for space systems engineering.  A series of pilot efforts were 
performed to explore the application of these ontological elements to some of the 
engineering disciplines.  The success of this phase contributed to the adoption of MBSE 
as the methodology for Systems Engineering of the formulation phase on the Europa 
Clipper pre-project [Cooke, 2015]. 
 INCOSE: As reported in [Kaslow et al., 2015]: “The International Council on Systems 
Engineering (INCOSE) Space Systems Working Group (SSWG) established the Space 
Systems MBSE Challenge team in 2007. The SSWG Challenge team has been 
investigating the applicability of MBSE for designing CubeSats since 2011.” This is 
heading towards development of a “Reference Model” for a typical space-ground 
system, one that can be used as a starting point for a mission-specific CubeSat model.  
Much of the work of developing an appropriate space systems engineering ontology is in 
clarifying language use within that domain. In the past one may have been ambiguous about 
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whether a spacecraft’s “mass” refers to its wet mass (fully fueled) or dry mass (without fuel), 
leaving it to the intelligence of the reader to infer which it is from context. But for MBSE models 
it is important to have clearly distinct notions for mass (wet) and mass (dry). Furthermore, when 
the scope of modeling encompasses the design and development phases as well as the 
operational phase, there are additional variations of “mass” to represent: allocated mass, 
estimated mass (t), allocated + reserve mass, etc.  It is this careful capture of terminology 
appropriate to space systems engineering that is both an initial disincentive (by forcing making 
explicitly making distinctions previously left implicit) and an eventual enabler. 
An ontology need not be, nor should be, a monolithic entity. Just as SysML is a layer on top 
of (most of) UML, a space systems engineering ontology will ideally be built on top of SysML in 
several more levels. This is the case for JPL’s ontology, which first adds to SysML a “Base” 
layer containing several fundamental concepts (e.g., that of an “IdentifiedElement” for any 
model element with an identifier and/or name(s)). Subsequent layers sit on top of that “Base” 
and thus are able to make use of its concepts. For example, in JPL’s ontology on top of the 
“Base” there’s a Mission portion (containing concepts such as Objectives, Components and 
Environments). In turn there is a Flight System portion that specializes mission concepts. 
Similarly, a layer itself need not be, nor necessarily should be, a monolithic entity. It can be 
compartmentalized into several portions, siblings with one another at the same level. For 
example, JPL has identified (and already developed some of) discipline-specific portions, such 
as “Navigation,” “Propulsion,” and “Telecommunications” to name but a few. 
In a similar manner, Figure 2, below, shows the structure of a Logical Space System Model. 
 
Figure 2 – Structure of a logical space system model. © 2015 IEEE. Reprinted, with 
permission, from D. Kaslow, L. Anderson, S. Asundi, B. Ayres, C. Iwata, B. Shiotani & R. 
Thompson, “Developing a CubeSat Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) Reference 
Model – Interim Status,” 2015 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 2015, pp. 1-16. 
Note that this is just part of what needs to be represented – in addition there is the Ground 
System, the Environment in which the mission takes place, the project planning and 
development phases including V&V. It should be apparent that a space systems engineering 
ontology must encompass a wide range of considerations, and its development will take time 
and effort. At JPL this is occurring as the Europa Clipper pre-project extends its modeling to 
include information from additional engineering disciplines (e.g., trajectory, thermal control). 
Similarly, the INCOSE CubeSat effort is following a staged process – the first phase dealt with 
the logical and physical architecture of a reference model and its application to a specific 
CubeSat; the second phase introduced behaviors; the third phase improved upon the behavioral 
aspects of the second phase, and also began development of a generic model. At the time of 
writing of [Kaslow et al., 2015] the fourth phase was underway to model system development, 
and expansion of the model scope to all lifecycle stages (including V&V) and all phases of 
operation (including degraded as well as normal). 
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As an ontology is extended, some modifications merely require adding a property to an 
existing object (e.g., adding the property “Requires inspection?” to a component or to a status 
object that references the component). These will have few ripple effects on the remainder of 
the ontology and the infrastructure built around it. Conversely, some modifications will have 
more far-reaching ramifications. Consider a reliability factor that needs the number of Operating 
hours on a piece of Flight hardware.  This requires connection of Operating hours to 
components of type Flight hardware.  The Components are in turn related to Test (V&V) objects 
that capture (via a new property) the Number of Hours Operated.  This simple example 
illustrates that the introduction of a new quantity (Operating Hours) will require ontology 
modifications to the part of the ontology defining Component and to the part of the ontology 
defining V&V concepts (Tests, so that they incur and track Operating Hours).  The point is that 
this will require coordination and agreement among the developers and users of different parts 
of the ontology. Modifications that are especially cross-cutting in nature, such as integrating the 
notion of risk, may have even farther reaching implications. If risks were merely items to track in 
5x5 matrices, their addition to an ontology would not be difficult.  However, NASA’s risk 
management practices involve identification of risk scenarios, likelihoods and consequences, 
and the processes for dealing with risks (accepting, watching, mitigating etc.) Properly 
accommodating the notion of risk into a space systems engineering ontology will need to be 
done with care.  
2.4 Mission Assurance 
The previous subsections provided a brief description of some of the key ideas and notions 
of MBSE.  MBSE’s emergence provides an opportunity for Mission Assurance to move from 
document-centric approaches, which often hinder the contribution and timely conduct of 
assurance activities, to objective-based products that are embedded within, and compatible 
with, the modeling used in an MBSE setting. To realize this improvement, mission assurance 
products and processes need to be able to fit within this framework.  For example, safety and 
reliability engineers must be closely linked to the development taking place in the MBSE 
framework, from requirements definition through analysis, to support trade studies and design 
analyses that assure the required reliability and safety. The MBSE framework may demand that 
reliability and safety analysis and related products take on a new shape. Overall, this new 
environment presents an unprecedented opportunity to improve effectiveness of the reliability 
and safety communities. This subsection summarizes developments within NASA’s OSMA that 
are conducive to this end. 
Contemporaneously with the advent of MBSE, NASA’s OSMA has begun the development 
and promulgation of a new objectives-based approach to standards. As stated in [Groen et al., 
2015] (emphasis added):  
“…NASA OSMA has developed an approach…to provide for flexibility … while 
focusing on a vision that is rooted in technical objectives rather than specifying specific 
products and processes. This approach uses the development of objectives hierarchies 
with supporting strategies for implementation. The results promise the potential of 
improved effectiveness, flexibility, and compatibility with Model Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE)…” 
The objectives-driven approach starts with a single top-level objective of a successful 
project. This is then broken down into sub-objectives much like the development of any systems 
engineering hierarchy.  Integral to this structure, however, is the use of Strategies to convey 
information about satisfying objectives. The strategy or strategies that couple with it identify non-
process specific methodologies for satisfying the objective. For example, Figure 3 shows the top 
level of OSMA’s Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Objectives Hierarchy [NASA OSMA R&M]. 
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Figure 3 – Top level of the Reliability and Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy. 
Reprinted from “Reliability and Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy” 
https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-source/News-Documents/r-amp-m-hierarchy.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
Unlimited distribution of Government document; no re-use statement required. 
This notation follows the style of the Goal Structuring Notation [Kelly & Weaver, 2004]. As 
used here, the top-level objective (the topmost blue rectangle) is decomposed into four sub-
objectives (the four blue rectangles at the bottom). The strategy for this decomposition is stated 
in the intermediary yellow box, and the context for all this is stated in the several orange 
rectangles to the right. Each objective block is coupled with at least one strategy that is used to 
facilitate accomplishment of the objective.  The four objectives at the bottom of Figure 3 are in 
turn decomposed into more detailed objectives. The R&M hierarchy was developed by a team 
that represented a significant cross section of the R&M expertise within NASA. The complete 
hierarchy is shown at the end of this document in the appendix.  
To date OSMA has developed Objectives Hierarchies for the following areas: 
 Reliability and Maintainability 
 Software Assurance 
 ELV Payload 
 Range Safety 
 Quality Assurance 
For background information and the first four of these, see [NASA OSMA, 2014]. It may be 
that ultimately there will be a single integrated hierarchy for all of the OSMA disciplines. 
The fundamental tenet of the objectives-driven approach is to define the technical objectives 
and strategies that constitute the assurance considerations for a system, as derived from a top-
level objective.  This decomposition is intended to help OSMA practitioners focus on the “what” 
they are trying to achieve without having the “how” dictated.  It is an integral part of OSMA’s 
shift towards use of a Risk Informed Safety Case (RISC) as the means by which to convey the 
argument for why a system is adequately safe [Dezfuli et al., 2014]. This shift applies to systems 
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whether engineered by traditional means, or by using MBSE techniques. As emphasized in the 
quote earlier, its flexibility permits compatibility with, and utilization of, MBSE.  
This is notionally indicated in 
Figure 4, to the right, where layers 
from bottom to top are as follows: 
 The bottom layer, “Effective 
Policies and Standards,” is 
based on Objective 
Hierarchies.  
 The layer above indicates that 
for systems that employ 
MBSE, much of their 
information is captured in 
models. For SysML in 
particular, models are 
conveyed through diagrams 
that fall into one or more of 
the areas shown in red, the 
four “pillars” of SysML (from 
the names “Structure”, 
“Requirements” and 
“Behavior” it is obvious the 
areas they cover; in SysML, 
“Parametrics” “represents 
constraints on system 
property values such as 
performance, reliability, and 
mass properties, and serves 
as a means to integrate the 
specification and design models with engineering analysis models” [SysML]. 
 A system’s MBSE models are used to inform the activities of Engineering Design and 
Assurance Analyses. Many of those activities will explore options in a trade space of 
design alternatives. Selections among these alternatives will be informed by the results of 
analyses performed on the designs (e.g., various forms of reliability analysis).  
 As development takes place, evidence is accumulated from the design process (e.g., 
analyses, tests, inspections, and relevant historical data).  
 In the vision espoused in [Dezfuli et al., 2014] this evidence is organized into the form of a 
Risk Informed Safety Case (RISC), or more generally, a Risk Informed Safety and Mission 
Success Case to cover both safety and mission success criteria. The system-independent 
Objective Hierarchies that informed the policies and standards can be used as templates 
to guide the development of the system-specific RISC – for an illustration, see [Witulski et 
al., 2016]. 
Figure 4 – Standards, models, engineering 
activities and safety/assurance cases. © 2016 IEEE. 
Reprinted, with permission, from J. Evans, S. Cornford & 
M.S. Feather, “Model based mission assurance: NASA’s 
assurance future,” 2016 Annual Reliability and 
Maintainability Symposium (RAMS), 2016, pp. 1-7. 
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3 MBSE’s implications for MBMA 
To understand MBSE’s implications for Mission Assurance, the future of which we’re calling 
MBMA, a survey of MBSE literature addressing space mission engineering concerns was 
conducted. The objective was to find how MBSE approaches are being (or could be) applied to 
support assurance needs. The detailed survey results are in the following section, are organized 
into seven areas. This section gives a summary of those seven areas, and to give them context, 
relates them to OSMA’s R&M Objectives Hierarchy. 
1. Representation and management of systems engineering information. Rigorous model-
based representation (i.e., with a semantic underpinning that ensures a shared, 
unambiguous understanding) of systems engineering information is the hallmark of MBSE. 
This rigorous foundation helps ensure consistency and some aspects of completeness of 
the systems engineering information. The desirable qualities have obvious relevance and 
benefit to the entire R&M Objectives Hierarchy to the extent that MBSE is carried through 
the mission lifecycle. May provide specific benefit in 1.B.1.A (Test, inspect, and 
demonstrate to an acceptable level to ensure that issues are found) through heading off 
subtle and hard to detect problems that stem from misinterpretations prevalent when less 
rigorous documentation is the norm. 
2. Support of the contractual interface between acquirer and potential suppliers. One purpose 
of using NASA’s Objectives Hierarchies is for it to be the means for a developer or service 
provider to communicate assurance information to NASA. In the R&M Objectives Hierarchy 
the conveyance of much of this information from acquirer to provider is indicated in the four 
context descriptions accompanying the top objective of the R&M hierarchy. 
These first two areas related to the R&M Objectives Hierarchy as shown in the Figure 5, 
below. 
Figure 5 – Where areas 1 & 2 support the R&M Objectives Hierarchy. Adapted 
from “Reliability and Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy” 
https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-source/News-Documents/r-amp-m-
hierarchy.pdf?sfvrsn=4 Unlimited distribution of Government document; no re-use 
statement required. 
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3. Generation of review documentation from the shared MBSE system model. Preliminary 
results from ongoing NASA applications show evidence of benefits to R&M Hierarchy 
1.A.1.A (Demonstrate to an acceptable level that the functionality of the system meets the 
design intent). Traditional review materials (text and tabular documents) are being 
generated from the system models rather than hand-composed, ensuring those materials 
reflect the consistency of MBSE’s “single authoritative source of truth.” This has potential to 
benefit reviews and evaluations between acquirer and provider at any Key Decision Point 
(KDP) provided MBSE covers that stage in the system’s lifecycle. Figure 6, below, thus 
suggests the universal scope of this with respect to the R&M Objectives Hierarchy. 
 
Figure 6 – Where area 3 supports the R&M Objectives Hierarchy. Adapted from 
“Reliability and Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy” https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-
source/News-Documents/r-amp-m-hierarchy.pdf?sfvrsn=4 Unlimited distribution of Government 
document; no re-use statement required. 
4. Automated assistance for generating reliability artifacts (FMECAs, Fault Trees, etc.). 
Relevant to sub-objectives 2 (System remains functional for intended lifetime, environment, 
operating conditions and usage), 3 (System is tolerant to faults, failures and other 
anomalous internal and external events), and to a lesser extent so far, 4 (System is 
designed to have an acceptable level of availability and maintenance demands). Generally, 
applications to date have been during design. It remains to be seen how MBSE will affect 
the later phases of development, most especially operations. 
5. Representation of and reasoning about off-nominal states and behaviors. This is a 
fundamental capability supporting the previous area (reliability artifacts), therefore likewise 
relevant to sub-objectives 2, 3 and 4. Several efforts have focused on developing 
automated assistance, using its needs to drive the initial development of the 
representation. 
These two areas relate to the R&M Objectives Hierarchy as shown in Figure 7, next page. 
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Figure 7 – Where areas 4 & 5 support the R&M Objectives Hierarchy. Adapted from 
“Reliability and Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy” https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-
source/News-Documents/r-amp-m-hierarchy.pdf?sfvrsn=4 Unlimited distribution of Government 
document; no re-use statement required. 
6. Support for activities post-design. While most of the MBSE literature focuses on the design 
stage, some address later activities, notably testing. Planning for and managing the testing 
activities could potentially benefit from the same MBSE principles of capturing the pertinent 
information in a formal representation, relevant to: 1.B.1.A, 2.A.1.D (Perform qualification 
testing and life demonstration to verify design for intended use), 2.B.1.D (Plan and perform 
life testing), 4.A.1.G (Provide demonstration testing to verify ‘detect, diagnose, isolate’ 
capability of systems and confirm corrective and preventive maintenance task actions and 
analysis) and 1.C.1.D (Screening, proof testing and acceptance testing). In the software 
arena there are instances of software being automatically generated from models, thus 
contributing to 1.C (Achieve high level of process reliability), and of software being 
extensively tested against computer simulations of the system and its operating conditions. 
Figure 8, next page, shows these specific R&M Objective areas in the hierarchy for sub-
objective 1, and Figure 9, page after, for the hierarchy for sub-objective 2. 
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Figure 8 – Where some area 6 activities support the R&M Objectives Hierarchy. Adapted 
from “Reliability and Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy” https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-
source/News-Documents/r-amp-m-hierarchy.pdf?sfvrsn=4 Unlimited distribution of Government 
document; no re-use statement required. 
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Figure 9 – Where some more area 6 activities support the R&M Objectives Hierarchy. 
Adapted from “Reliability and Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy” 
https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-source/News-Documents/r-amp-m-hierarchy.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
Unlimited distribution of Government document; no re-use statement required. 
 
7. Correctness of the MBSE models themselves. Since the system design information is 
captured in models, it is crucial that they be correct, with obvious relevance all the previous six 
areas and where they relate to the R&M Objectives Hierarchy. 
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4 MBMA details found in the MBSE literature 
This section presents the detailed results of our survey of the MBSE literature as it pertains 
to space mission engineering concerns, in particular how MBSE approaches are being (or could 
be) applied to support mission assurance needs. These results are organized into the seven 
areas introduced in the previous section, namely: 
1. Representation and management of systems engineering information 
2. Support of the contractual interface between acquirer and potential suppliers 
3. Generation of review documentation from the shared MBSE system model 
4. Automated assistance for generating reliability artifacts (FMECAs, Fault Trees, etc.). 
5. Representation of and reasoning about off-nominal states and behaviors. 
6. Support for activities post-design. 
7. Correctness of the MBSE models themselves. 
4.1 Representation and management of systems engineering information 
In general, many papers and presentations argue for the benefit of model-centric rather than 
document-centric design; the following examples report application to space systems. 
Integration of flight software developed for the James Webb Space Telescope’s Integrated 
Science Instrument Module is briefly reported in [Aguilar, 2012]. The C&DH Core Flight 
Software (FSW) development was done at GSFC and the Science Instrument FSW applications 
were developed by different teams at several disparate locations. A Rational Rose Structure 
Diagram was used to unambiguously indicate the core system’s communication ports to other 
subsystem components and to its own internal “capsules”.  
Use of MBSE to manage development of the ground system for control of the OSIRIS-Rex 
spacecraft during its encounter with asteroid Bennu is described in [Wibben & Furfaro, 2015]. 
Three areas are listed as benefiting from MBSE: representation and flow down of the 
requirements on the ground system, representation of its architecture (leading to development 
of the formal documentation of that architecture in the form of Interface Control Documents and 
Operational Interface Agreements), and capture of testing and V&V plans. In addition to 
diagramming static views of the architecture, FFBDs (Functional Flow Block Diagrams) are used 
to support discrete-event simulation of system behaviors to validate the system’s run-time 
behavior. 
Similar benefits are reported in [Karban et al., 2014] in the related area of systems 
engineering of astronomical telescopes. 
Another important benefit of MBSE’s single authoritative source of information is to serve as 
the intermediary among a federation of special-purpose representations and tools. This is seen, 
for example, in [Kaslow et al., 2014] where MBSE behavioral modeling of a CubeSat mission is 
connected to analytic capabilities (MATLAB® and STK®).  The use of MBSE to manage the 
connection of system data with simulation environments is also the subject of [Cencetti, 2014]. 
Both of these show how the combination of MBSE and simulation can support conducting 
sensitivity analyses and trade studies of alternative designs. This is useful for the purpose of 
approaching an optimal design, not merely a good-enough design – an aspect that is called for 
in the system safety concept of “As Safe As Reasonably Practicable” (ASARP) [Dezfuli et al., 
2014], or, for purely robotic missions once they have left Earth, As Successful As Reasonably 
Practicable. 
4.2 Support of the contractual interface 
A report on “research practices pertaining to methods, tools, and techniques proposed to 
facilitate the use of MBSE across the contractual interface in a competitive tender environment” 
is given in [Do et al., 2014]. The authors assert that MBSE has long been successfully applied 
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across contractual boundaries in settings where “mutual trust is well developed and mutual 
goals are well understood.” Their paper addresses the situation of a competitive environment, 
where a supplier would wish to excise proprietary information from the model they submit as 
part of the bid, and the acquirer would wish to excise certain sensitive information (e.g., costing, 
management) from the model they put forth to elicit bids. The paper lists details on these topics 
resulting from “workshops with key stakeholders.” They go on to mention that the acquirer’s 
model served as a good starting point for the supplier to elaborate further into a more detailed 
model. 
4.3 Generation of review documentation 
“Document/Expert – Centric Acquisition” is contrasted with “Data-Driven/MBSE Acquisition” 
in [Montgomery, 2014], which suggests many of the analysis results needed for acquisition 
decisions can be machine-generated from models, replacing labor intensive human 
assessments by teams of experts.  
Textual forms of the acquirer’s Operational Concept Document, Function and Performance 
Specification and Test Concept Document are described as being generated from a reference 
model in [Do et al., 2014]. It also goes on to say that some members of the supplier team 
worked directly from the model, and those that initially preferred to work from the generated 
textual forms increasingly switched to the model. 
A pilot study on a “moderate size flight project” – MISSE-X, a payload for hosting 
experiments, to be installed on the exterior of the ISS is reported in [Vipavetz et al., 2012]. The 
report discussed the pros and cons of MBSE in preparation for the project’s System 
Requirements Review. They used: 
 SysML to “document the system concept of operations as well as some assembly, 
integration and test activities” (use-case diagrams for stakeholder interactions, activity 
diagrams to document system functions, activity diagrams, state-machine diagrams and 
sequence diagrams to document intended behavior, package diagram of system 
architecture and external boundaries, IBD for flows and interfaces between systems) and  
 Vitech’s CORE™ to manage the requirements (traceability through levels of requirements, 
allocations, owners and verification methods).  
They report benefits of consistency, ease of access to complete, current information, and 
clarity across the team. The review need was to demonstrate existence of a feasible and 
satisfactory system design (feasible = could be implemented consistent with cost, schedule & 
risk; satisfactory = design meets project goals). Exports from CORE were used to provide 
information to team members without requiring them to be CORE users, and to generate 
complete documents directly from CORE. Review materials were developed from the SysML 
and CORE models. However, their paper identifies several challenges: 
 “no guarantee that the model is correct” – note that they did not pursue extensively 
execution of models, stating “developing executable models within the model itself was 
found to be challenging” 
 Restarts in creating the meta-model (ontology) 
 Default presentation options from SysML tool often needed extensive re-working. 
Modeling followed by document generation was used to generate the contents of an 
assessment report of NASA Ground Systems Development and Operations’ (GSDO) plan to 
verify their command and control software [Aguilar et al., 2014]. The modeling focused on 
physical and logical interfaces, and its role in the assessment is indicated by Figure 10, below. 
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Figure 10 – Model-based IRD/ICD interface review process. Reprinted from M. Aguilar, 
K. Bonanne, J.A. Favretto, M.M. Jackson, S.L. Jones, R.M. Mackey, M.A. Sarrel & K.A. 
Simpson, Review of Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Tools for Verifying 
Command and Control Software, NASA/TM-2014-218278, June 2014, with permission of the 
authors. 
The information available to the review team allowed them to perform requirements gap 
analysis (looking for missing and inconsistent requirements), and a limited amount of functional 
analysis. The document further states that “All text, tables, and illustrations in the GAILA [GSDO 
Avionics Integration Laboratories Assessment] report were extracted and formatted from the 
SysML model repository.” 
4.4 Generation of reliability artifacts 
There are numerous examples of MBSE being used to provide automated assistance to 
generate reliability artifacts (FMECAs, Fault Trees, etc.).  
Generation of FMEAs from SysML information, specifically from Sequence Diagrams (SDs) 
and Internal Block Diagrams (IBDs), is described in [David et al., 2009] & [Cressent et al., 2011] 
(see also the next section for further papers by the same set of authors). They assume a 
database (referred to in the paper as a “Dysfunctional Behavior Database”) of components and 
their failure properties – their failure modes, and (optionally) additional information such as 
failure rate. They further allow for the following: 
 A Parametric Diagram (PD) expressing the computation of functional attributes 
degradation during the failure mode occurrence.  
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 A PD indicating the computation of the failure rate of each failure mode. (This constraint 
depends on the environmental and structural parameters) 
 A Statechart Diagram describing the dynamic behavior of the component in the failure 
mode state. 
They stress that in IBDs they utilize two kinds of ports – standard ports and flow ports. 
Standard ports are suited for representing control and command requests (including exchange 
of information); flow ports are suited to representation of data, material or energy flowing 
through the connectors to/from such ports. 
Scalable, automated generation of a FMEA, illustrated on a model of a satellite, its ground 
control system, and ground users is concisely reported in [Hecht et al., 2014]. They assume a 
SysML model with BDDs, IBDs (in which failure propagation paths are represented), state 
transition machines (including both normal and failed states) and activity diagrams (that 
generate the triggers driving state transitions). From these they also automatically generate a 
model to input into AltaRica (“a tool and language implementing mode automata”) to model fault 
propagation. 
Collaborations between Johnson Space Center and Tietronix Software Inc. are reported in 
[Wang et al., 2015] & [Sargusingh et al., 2015]. Generation of a FMECA and a Fault Tree from a 
SysML model is illustrated in [Wang et al., 2015]. They too assume that SysML IBD has the 
details of the system architecture and that the state transition diagrams include nominal and off-
nominal (failed) states, using state machine events and guards to encode propagation of failure 
effects from one component to another. The example they use as illustration is a “Common 
Cabin Air Assembly” to provide life-critical air circulation in the ISS, and they show how the 
generated FMECA takes into account the fault-tolerance provided by redundancy in the 
modeled system. It does not appear that they deal with continuous physical flows in the same 
manner [David et al., 2009]. Application to design of a water recycling system (the “Cascade 
Distillation System”) intended for use in the context of a human mission to Mars (for which high 
reliability and low mass are both driving concerns that make the design a challenge) is reported 
in [Sargusingh et al., 2015]. The paper shows the results of their tooling to (a) “extract the 
FMECA from the … FSMs (Finite State Machines) defining the possible failed states” and (b) 
“traverse behavior diagrams to extract the fault event paths for analysis”, combining these into a 
fault tree. 
An approach to automatic generation of FMEA and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) artifacts from 
system models is outlined in [Mhenni et al., 2014a] & [Mhenni et al., 2014b]. Their FMEA 
generation process starts from a top-level functional breakdown for the system, and yields a list 
of generic failure modes for those functions and potential causes and effects. At this stage 
additional failure modes can be added manually. Having allocated components to functions, the 
generation of a component FMEA proceeds in a similar manner. Their Fault Tree generation 
process utilizes the FMEAs, and hinges on graph-traversals of SysML Internal Block Diagrams 
(IBDs) that express component interactions and the internal structure (connectivity) of the 
system. They show how they convert patterns inside an IBD representing redundancy or 
feedback loops into the corresponding fault tree structures using AND and OR gates as 
appropriate. They use as illustration an electromechanical actuator used to actuate ailerons – 
this is described as a case study, but not an actual industrial application. 
4.5 Off-nominal states and behaviors 
Off-nominal behavior, of particular interest to the OSMA practitioners, has begun to be 
explored in the context of MBSE.  Open questions remain regarding the integration of risk into 
the models and a methodology for managing/reducing these risks. 
Verification of fault management behavior by execution of a model of NASA’s Ares & Orion 
communication during abort is briefly reported in [Aguilar, 2013]. This provides an illustration of 
 22 
a missing transition guard, presumably discovered in a simulation that exhibited an unwanted 
launch delay. Other examples of errors “found through modeling” are also listed. 
A small manually conducted feasibility study, of representing failures so as to check for 
safety and security properties such as “robust to any single failure”, “robust to erroneous data”, 
“resilient to fake GPS signal” is reported in [Brunel et al., 2014]. They indicate the potential for 
translation into Alloy, a language and toolset for formal analysis of consistency. 
The need to integrate the representation of, and reasoning about, off-nominal behavior with 
the standard system engineering process is addressed in [Cressent et al., 2013]. They describe 
typical reliability activities (e.g., FMEA) and their data sources & sinks. They stress the need to 
model the dynamics of off-nominal behaviors, presenting a meta-model (ontology extensions) 
appropriate to this, including treatment of off-nominal behaviors at multiple levels of abstraction 
(boolean to represent working or not; qualitative to include representation of “degraded” 
conditions; formulae for quantitative calculations e.g., using failure rate values). Semi-
automated mapping from SysML into AADL for purposes of analyzing real-time computational 
aspects of the system is detailed in [Cressent et al., 2010] (the AADL language and associated 
tools provide another model-based approach to representation and reasoning for real-time 
software systems development; see also [Fernández, 2014] for AADL and MBSE).  
Figure 11, next page, from [Cressent et al., 2013], shows the role of various forms of 
analyses and the data they ingest/produce. In that paper it is captioned as “Fig. 1. A project 
lifecycle process example. Req & Cons, Requirements and Constraints; PHA, Preliminary 
Hazard Analysis; FMEA, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis; FFMEA, Functional Failure Mode 




Figure 11 – Various analyses and the data they ingest. Reprinted from Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 111, R. Cressent, P. David, V. Idasiak & F. Kratz, “Designing 
the database for a reliability aware Model-Based System Engineering process,” 171-182, 
copyright 2013, with permission from Elsevier. 
 
A “safety profile” – stereotypes to extend SysML in order to represent information relevant to 
failures etc. (“safety profile” could equivalently be called meta-model or ontology) is presented in 
[Mhenni et al., 2014a]. They offer a case study using it to represent failure information for an 
electromechanical actuator – specifically, an actuator of the ailerons in an aircraft. They also 
describe semi-automatic generation of FMEAs from this information – see the “Automated 
assistance for generating reliability artifacts” subsection for further discussion of this.  
Some details of their approach to representing off-nominal information are seen in Figure 12 
and Figure 13, next page.  
 24 
 
Figure 12 – Class diagram for FMEA artifacts. © IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from 
F. Mhenni, J-Y. Choley & N. Nguyen, “SysML Safety Profile for Mechatronics,” in Mecatronics 
(MECATRONICS), 2014 10th France-Japan / 8th Europe-Asia Congress on, 2014, pp. 29-34. 
 
Figure 13 – Safety profile diagram. © IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from F. Mhenni, 
J-Y. Choley & N. Nguyen, “SysML Safety Profile for Mechatronics,” in Mecatronics 
(MECATRONICS), 2014 10th France-Japan / 8th Europe-Asia Congress on, 2014, pp. 29-34. 
25 
A similar approach is followed in [Biggs et al., 2016], presenting a SysML profile 
(appropriately named “SafeML”) specifically for representing safety-related concerns of a 
system. Profiles are given for representing hazardous events and for defenses to them. The 
paper also shows the use of alternative model views, generated automatically from the model 
by a plug-in to the tool being used to support SysML. For example, a matrix view relating harm 
contexts to the defenses against those harms is used to provide a convenient overview from 
which it is easy to see which, if any, harm contexts lack defenses. Figure 14, below, shows this 
paper’s SafeML profile to represent hazardous events; see the paper for a similar figure 
showing the profile for elements related to defenses. 
 
Figure 14 – Profile elements relating to hazardous events. Springer Journal of Software and 
Systems Modeling, “A profile and tool for modelling safety information with design information in 
SysML,” 15(1), 2016, 147-178, G. Biggs, T. Sakamoto & T. Kotoku, © 2016. With permission of 
Springer. 
Note that in terms of what’s included, this is similar to the safety profile from [Mhenni et al., 
2014a] presented earlier – both approaches to profiles provide attributes of Severity and 
Probability, for example, but do so in different ways.  
4.6 Support for activities post-design 
The majority of reports of MBSE applications (and hence the majority of the attention) has 
so far been focused on systems in their early phases. Nevertheless, several papers take the 
approach of looking ahead to how MBSE might assist those later lifecycle phases. In particular, 
using MBSE to model V&V activities is a common theme. 
 
The argument for a model of system information that spans the entire lifecycle, all the way 
from design choices, through development and V&V, to operation, appeared in [Cornford et al., 
2006]. The main elements of this model are requirements, functions, components, risks, work 
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breakdown structure, and implementation – that last encompassing operational scenarios in 
which the modeled system is analyzed for its operational performance. This end-to-end model 
allows study of the cost and schedule implications of alternative designs and alternative 
approaches to their V&V, and the resulting likelihoods of mission success measured in terms of 
probabilistic attainments of mission objectives. The key addition this paper offered to model 
based engineering frameworks was its representation of risk (through inclusion of off-nominal 
behaviors of the system’s components).  
The Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST) reports having “implemented a Model Based 
Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach as a means of defining all systems engineering 
planning and definition activities that have historically been captured in paper documents” [Selvy 
et al., 2014]. This paper “details the methodology employed to use the tool (Enterprise Architect) 
to document the verification planning phases, including the extension of the language (SysML) 
to accommodate the project’s needs. They use SysML’s extensibility to define a 
“VerificationPlanning” stereotype, with the attributes appropriate to representation of traditional 
verification information (e.g., verification method, verification requirement, success criteria). 
Figure 15, below, from the paper, shows requirements connected to VerificationPlanning 
elements (indicated by links labelled “<<refine>>”) and those VerificationPlanning in turn 
connected to VerificationActivities (indicated by the links labelled “<<verify>>”). 
 
Figure 15 – An information model for Requirements, Verification Planning and Test 
Cases. Reprinted from B.M. Selvy, C. Claver & G. Angeli, “Using SysML for Verification and 
Validation Planning on the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST),” SPIE Astronomical 
Telescopes + Instrumentation, pp. 91500N-91500N. International Society for Optics and 
Photonics, 2014, copyright SPIE. With permission from SPIE and the authors. 
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The paper goes on to show use of SysML Activity Diagrams to capture the sequencing of 
the verification events (test cases), and to show use of SysML behavior diagrams to capture the 
individual steps (actions) of a verification event. 
In a similar fashion, the topic of “Managing the development of system testing using the 
principles of Model Based System Engineering” is addressed in [Kratzke, 2014]. It makes the 
observation that requirements, functions and components (which are repeated as the core 
concepts of many of the systems engineering ontologies) all factor into system testing. Kratzke 
proposes the ontology shown in Figure 16, below, for representation of information surrounding 
tests and their role in verification. 
 
Figure 16 – An information model for test activities and events. Reprinted from R. Kratzke, 
“MBSE for System Testing,” Systems Engineering Conference (SEDC2014), 2014. Reprinted 
with permission of Vitech Corporation Available from http://www.sedcconference.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/M-9_Model-based-System-Engineering-MBSE-for.pptx 
The question “could system integration and verification planning benefit from the capabilities 
of MBSE?” is addressed in [Salado, 2013], which also “proposes an information model to use 
model-based systems engineering to actually plan integration and test activities of a system.” 
The usual benefits attributed to model-centric representations of design information (single 
source of information, model-based rather than document based, representation of relationships 
between artifacts) are described as applicable to systems integration and verification. The paper 
reports having developed an information model with which to represent integration and test 
artifacts and activities.  This paper offers an information model featuring an Integration and Test 
(I&T) activity object associated with a Verification requirement, Test Configuration, etc., as seen 
in Figure 17, next page. 
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Figure 17 – An information model for system integration and test. Reprinted from INCOSE 
International Symposium, Vol. 23, No. 1, A. Salado, “Efficient and Effective Systems Integration 
and Verification Planning Using a Model-Centric Environment,” 1159-1173, copyright 2013, with 
permission from John Wiley and Sons. 
“V&V may be the biggest benefactor from the MBSE approach” is asserted in [Wibben & 
Furfaro, 2015], which goes on to say “… by mapping requirements to architecture and defining 
operational scenarios as they are being developed, …, the basis for defining detailed verification 
descriptions, success criteria, and other verification artifacts are distributed throughout the 
lifecycle.” Figure 18, below, from the paper, shows high level connections and definitions used 
for V&V of requirements. 
 
Figure 18 – An information model for verification. Reprinted from Acta Astronautica, 115, 
D.R. Wibben & F. Furfaro, “Model-Based Systems Engineering approach for the development of 
the science processing and operations center of the NASA OSIRIS-REx asteroid sample return 
mission,” 147-159, copyright 2015, with permission from Elsevier. 
Verification of safety requirements in software-intensive systems is considered in [Pétin et 
al., 2010]. They point out that formal (mathematical) methods are required to rigorously prove 
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safety properties, and discuss translation from typical SysML representations to the models and 
properties needed by the formal methods, for example the model checker UPPAAL (from 
www.uppaal.org “UPPAAL is an integrated tool environment for modeling, validation and 
verification of real-time systems modeled as networks of timed automata, extended with data 
types (bounded integers, arrays, etc.”). They present an example of a mechanical press 
controlled by software in a programmable logic controller, considering the verification of 
requirements allocations from system to its components, a mix of software, mechanical and 
electro-mechanical. 
The use of Model Based Software development to develop much of the on-board software 
of the LADEE spacecraft, and also to develop ground code to simulate the spacecraft, is 
reported in [Gundy-Burlet, 2013] and [Benz et al., 2015]. The latter was used in extensive 
testing of the on-board software, in operator training during mission simulations and readiness 
testing, and for verification of command sequences prior to their uploading to the spacecraft 
during the operational portion of the mission. 
4.7 Correctness of the MBSE models themselves 
Ways to address the question of correctness of MBSE models are advocated in 
[Montgomery, 2014]. It describes useful (manual) inspections of several of the kinds of models 
found in typical MBSE developments, using as illustration reference systems from grad school 
projects (in the naval domain). The inspections are listed below. Briefly, they cover: 
requirements; mission and operations and interoperability; functionality, interfaces and 
continuity; system content flow; system behavior; system realization; allocation, and integrity; 
integrate-ability; qualify-ability.   
List of inspections extracted from [Montgomery, 2014], with permission of the author: 
 Requirements: 
 “Hierarchy depth indicates strength of requirements derivation” 
 “Requirements allocated to system functions/components sets foundation for 
qualification (V&V)” 
 Mission and operations and interoperability 
 “External system diagramming [using ICOM diagrams - inputs, control, outputs, and 
mechanisms] identifies critical interoperability interfaces” – check the 
sources/destinations of the ICOM inputs and outputs 
 Check that a “CONOP must manifest into mission activities and data flow” 
 Functionality 
 “Hierarchy depth indicates functional design understanding and fidelity” 
 Inspect for appropriate depth, allocations, orphans 
 Interfaces and continuity: “Ensure connection completeness” 
 “N2 diagramming is good tally of interfaces (both functional and physical) and is a 
“Better “eye-ready” assessment”, during which look for: “missing squares”, Vacant 
quadrant, Sparse matrix, Missing externals, High density I/O – Figure 19, next page. 
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Figure 19 – An N2 diagram of system interfaces. Reprinted from “’Top-10’ MBSE 
Tool Inspections to Analyze System Design Quality,” P. Montgomery, Systems Engineering 
Conference, 2014 (SEDC2014), copyright 2014 Paul R. Montgomery, with the permission of the 
author. Available from http://www.sedcconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/M-1_Top-
10-MBSE-Tool-Inspections.ppt  
 System Content Flow (presented in an IDEF0 diagram); inspect for: 
 Disconnects, Missing ICOM inputs/outputs 
 System Logical control; inspect the control flow (linear sequences, branching, loops, 
iterations, etc.) 
 System Behavior – inspect sequence diagrams for: 
 Un-triggered functions, No follow-on trigger, Unallocated functions 
 System Realization, Allocation, and Integrity; inspect for: 
 Allocations, Traceability, Continuity, Uneven Depth 
 Integrate-ability; inspect for: 
 Complex functional interactions; Poor external interface definition; Conops-design 
breakage; Loss of taxonomy control 
 Qualify-ability; inspect for: 
 Poor external interface definition (validation risk); Conops-design breakage; Loss of 
taxonomy control; Quantifiable requirements; Lack of V&V traceability 
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Some of the inspections listed above could be implemented as automated checks (e.g., to 
look for “Unallocated functions” in sequence diagrams) while some require human judgement to 
assess (e.g., “complex functional interactions”) – the latter bear a resemblance to the typical 
metrics suggested for Object Oriented designs (e.g., coupling, cohesion). 
Accreditation of models used in embedded systems, specifically diagnostic models, is the 
subject of [Kodali & Robinson, 2014]. As pointed out in this paper, accreditation of such models 
is not sufficiently covered by NASA-STD-7009A [NASA, 2016] (whose focus is on the physics in 
models and simulations), the software engineering requirements of NPR 7150.2A, [NASA, 2014] 
or the combination of the two. The diagnostic models they consider, while not MBSE models per 
se, have similar characteristics to MBSE system models. 
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5 Observations derived from stakeholder interviews 
As technologies and new approaches emerge, there is a predictable phenomenon of local 
pockets of early adoption which grow and eventually become the new norm.  NASA has such an 
innovative culture that inevitably some of its local pockets of early adopters of MBSE are 
unaware of each other.  The stakeholder interviews performed were an important part of this 
MBMA roadmapping effort, and aimed to accomplish two things: 
1. Discover ideas, concerns and opportunities from those interviewed (stakeholders) 
2. Share ongoing ideas and efforts identified by the literature search. 
The intention was to both learn and teach. Often, fear of new ideas is a result of 
misunderstandings about the new idea. 
The interviews were informal and most were in person.  See appendix A Stakeholder 
Interviews for the names and roles of those interviewed. Interviews covered five main topic 
areas: 
 Awareness of, and familiarity with, MBSE  
 Current challenges facing OSMA, and how MBSE might (or might not) help address 
them 
 Emerging challenges facing OSMA, and how MBSE might (or might not) help address 
them 
 Priorities 
 MBSE features of interest 
5.1 Stakeholders 
Most of those interviewed were generally aware of MBSE, although most were not familiar 
with its details.  Most were not clear about the impacts MBSE might have on OSMA disciplines 
and operations.  All were generally open to the opportunities presented to avoid the “stupid” 
errors that computers/logic would readily avoid or catch.  Most expressed concerns about things 
“slipping through the cracks” if OSMA practices change significantly.  Much of this is because 
the current OSMA “tapestry of coverage” has been stitched together over years, and there is 
great confidence in how it is currently working, but concern that something will be overlooked if 
it is “re-stitched.” 
Responses to the topic of current challenges varied widely, but many of the same themes 
were repeated: 
 The challenges of providing timely information and of finding and accessing current data 
   The “n-1” problem1  
   Chasing down documents 
   Never sure about latest version 
  The ability to have OSMA folks trained and learning curves 
  What happens during the transition period? 
  The widening gap between HW and SW assurance 
  The ability to tap into data being generated 




1 In traditional (non-MBSE) engineering some of the artifacts generated by Mission Assurance take significant 
manual effort to produce; hence by the time they have been created and analyzed, the project may have already 
moved on to version “n”, rendering results for the project’s version “n-1” potentially obsolete. 
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In addition, a number of challenges were identified that were somewhat more discipline 
specific: 
 Utilization of COTS parts 
 Integration between system-level behavior and low-level attributes (parts, solder joints, 
etc.) 
 Ability to identify/develop/utilize surrogate models 
 Ability to integrate both lessons learned and Lessons Learned. 
 Ability to integrate checklists 
In most cases, the emerging challenges were very similar to the current challenges with the 
acceptance of MBSE.  The emerging challenges were all about making sure the current 
capabilities and successes are not lost. 
Most of those surveyed were optimistic about the opportunities for improvement afforded by 
the transition to MBSE.  The Safety Case approach which integrates all available information 
(both quantitative and qualitative) is consistent with the MBSE approach to providing Views 
linked to relevant information.  The ability to directly include risk in both implementation and 
operation models will provide an unprecedented opportunity to directly trade-off margins and 
risk with performance and cost. 
5.2 Practitioners 
The practitioners surveyed included a variety of people ranging from Lead System 
Engineers, to System Engineering researchers, to modelers.   They all were extremely capable 
in some or all aspects of MBSE.  They are currently overwhelmed with work, as the transition to 
MBSE has been rapid.  Many were not aware of some aspects of ongoing research.  All 
welcomed support and contribution by OSMA personnel but did not have the time or inclination 
to teach them the language of SysML. They encouraged us to provide them with some well-
trained support that would act as the interface between the modelers and the OSMA 
stakeholders. 
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6 Primary findings / observations 
6.1 Assurance is a latecomer to MBSE 
The initial focus of the MBSE community has been on addressing the core competencies 
and activities of systems engineering – developing the means by which a system’s 
requirements, structure, behavior, development, testing and operation can be addressed in a 
model-centric manner. Our examination of some of the published literature on revealed that so 
far assurance has been given little, if any, attention. For example, [Kaslow et al., 2015] reports 
on the INCOSE Space Systems MBSE Challenge team’s investigation of the applicability of 
MBSE for designing CubeSats; the reference model presented there shows the diagram of 
CubeSat stakeholders, Figure 20, below, from which assurance is noticeably absent. 
 
 
Figure 20 – CubeSat stakeholders. © 2015 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from D. 
Kaslow, L. Anderson, S. Asundi, B. Ayres, C. Iwata, B. Shiotani & R. Thompson, “Developing a 
CubeSat Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) Reference Model – Interim Status,” 2015 
IEEE Aerospace Conference, pp. 1-16, 2015. 
At least there is a mention of assurance in the paper, in the form of the statement “System 
engineering artifacts can be extracted from the model, which can be used to demonstrate 
mission assurance to the stakeholders.” Many other papers lack any explicit mention of 
assurance. 
The initial lack of focus on assurance is reasonable – MBSE first has to demonstrate its 
viability for engineering purposes in order to become accepted, and this process remains still 
very much a work in progress. There is a danger, however, that by being a latecomer to 
treatment by MBSE community, assurance will be overlooked for too long.  
An indication that the time is ripe to making assurance more involved in the MBSE-based 
engineering processes is seen in the interplay between MBSE and NASA’s traditional review 
processes, where at Key Decision Points (KDPs) a project must demonstrate the adequacy of 
its status relative to its stage in the development lifecycle. MBSE practitioners have stated that 
for the time being they prepare for these reviews by generating (from the MBSE models) the 
forms of textual documentation traditionally expected by review boards (for example the 
quotation above). This is appropriate as a way to interface an MBSE-savvy project with a non-
MBSE-savvy review board. The latter need not be concerned with the way the review material 
was created, and continue to perform their scrutiny and assessment of the review materials as 
they would for any kind of project. However, such an approach isolates the review board from 
taking advantage of MBSE to achieve improvements to the review process itself. Some of the 
possibilities in this direction are discussed next. 
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6.2 A potential change of emphasis for assurance 
A key tenet of MBSE is its shift towards a “single-source-of-truth,” in which every 
engineering data element is stored exactly once, thus ensuring that all artifacts generated from 
this information are all consistent with one another. To make this possible, MBSE strives to 
represent as much as possible of the systems engineering information in computerized models, 
rather than as paper or electronic documents. For example, the abstract of [Chung et al., 2012] 
reads in part as follows: 
When designing a flight system from concept through implementation, one of the 
fundamental systems engineering tasks is managing the mass margin and a mass 
equipment list (MEL) of the flight system. While generating a MEL and computing a 
mass margin is conceptually a trivial task, maintaining consistent and correct MELs and 
mass margins can be challenging due to the current practices of maintaining duplicate 
information in various forms, such as diagrams and tables, and in various media, such 
as files and emails. We have overcome this challenge through a model-based systems 
engineering (MBSE) approach within which we allow only a single-source-of-truth. 
One of the implications for reviews is that there is far less need to check for this kind of 
consistency.  Instead, the review board members’ time would be better spent on applying their 
engineering judgement to assess the less readily quantifiable aspects of a project. For example, 
[Wibben & Furfaro, 2015] report on MBSE used in development of the science processing and 
operations center for an upcoming NASA mission, and state: 
“…this [MBSE] approach has been lauded in key mission reviews as a significant 
strength of the project, especially for its ability to provide a consistent approach for the 
entire ground systems team” 
However, in order to relax their usual scrutiny of consistency a review board would have to 
have the confidence that the MBSE process has indeed ensured consistency. To do so they 
would want to ensure themselves that the MBSE computing infrastructure can be relied upon 
(e.g., document generation processes faithfully reproduce the information in the models) and 
that configuration control has been appropriately conducted on the models and the generated 
artifacts. This means the board would have to have an awareness and understanding of the 
MBSE processes. 
More significantly, could the review board take advantage of access to the MBSE models 
themselves, instead of to just the documentation artifacts of a traditional review? For example, 
might the review board wish to explore the models directly? Might they wish to formulate their 
own queries of the model to derive answers to questions as they arise in the review?  
Within an engineering team it is natural to incrementally transition towards use of MBSE by 
first providing non-MBSE-savvy engineers access to the traditional forms of documentation they 
are accustomed to. As they become exposed to their MBSE-savvy colleagues’ direct use of 
models they may then transition. This phenomenon is reported in [Do et al., 2014] where they 
state: 
“It is interesting to note that some project members found the documents easier to 
digest, particularly if they were familiar with CDD [Capability Definition Document] 
documents whereas others, whereas those with substantial MBSE experience were 
happier familiarizing themselves with the project definition material directly from the 
model. As the project progressed, the model was used increasingly by all 
participants.” [emphasis added] 
While this kind of transition might be expected to occur within an engineering team, it will 
likely take a more directed effort to achieve the same transition in review boards given that they 
are deliberately chosen to be independent of the project they are reviewing. 
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6.3 Reliability: where assurance advantages of MBSE are beginning to be 
realized 
Our survey of the MBSE literature, and our observation of MBSE activities within NASA, 
both point to reliability as an area where the assurance advantages of MBSE are thought to be 
available, and in some instance beginning to be realized in project applications. 
In traditional (non-MBSE) systems engineering it is common for Fault Trees and FMECAs to 
be generated for purposes of reliability engineering and assurance. Traditionally, these kinds of 
artifacts are prone to what might be termed the “n-1” problem: their creation takes significant 
manual effort; hence by the time they have been created and analyzed, the project may have 
already moved on, rendering their results potentially obsolete. Furthermore, these artifacts draw 
upon system-wide information (e.g., for Fault Tree construction, to assess the different causes 
of a mission failure within a system design; for FMECA construction, to assess the system and 
mission effects of a component failure). This makes it appealing to consider generating them 
automatically (or at least semi-automatically, reducing if not entirely eliminating the manual 
effort) from the information contained in MBSE models. 
Reports of reliability artifact creation from MBSE information having been developed and 
applied are seen in the following:  
 the FMEA of an experimental ramjet powered vehicle [Cressent et al., 2001];  
 the FMEA of a satellite’s ground control system [Hecht et al., 2014];  
 the FMEA and Fault Tree of an electro-mechanical actuator that controls ailerons 
[Mhenni et al., 2014b];  
 the FMECA and Fault Tree of the “Cascade Distillation System,” the flight-forward 
prototype of a system to recover water from wastewater ultimately indented to become a 
payload experiment on the ISS [Sargusingh et al., 2015]. 
The last one is particularly noteworthy because the success of the initial activity, performed 
by Tietronix under an SBIR in conjunction with systems engineers at JSC, led to a continuation 
of the approach at JPL for application (it is anticipated) to JPL projects. In addition, the JPL 
ontology experts collaborated with JPL reliability experts to develop the portions of an ontology 
suited to representation of off-nominal conditions (faults and failures, the scenarios in which 
they may occur, their causes, their consequences, their mitigation, etc.). In phase 1 Tietronix 
developed prototype plug-ins to a SysML tool that would automatically construct a FMECA and 
a Fault Tree from the SysML-represented system information. In Phase 2 of Tietronix’s SBIR 
they plan to adapt their plug-ins to work with the elaborated ontology that has resulted from the 
JPL work. This is an exemplary demonstration of the cross-center transfer of advancements in 
MBSE’s support for assurance. It also illustrates how ontology development is intertwined with 
development of tool support: the initial activity employed just enough of an ontology of faults to 
be able to demonstrate the viability of automatic FMECA and Fault Tree generation. The 
subsequent JPL work has extended this ontology to make it suitable for a wider range of 
reliability purposes, including representation and generation of risk scenarios (the foundation of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment) and representation and generation of Fault Containment 
Regions and the list of interfaces that cross their boundaries. 
6.4 Assurance of MBSE’s models, processes and tools 
Assurance to establish confidence in MBSE’s models, processes and tools is an aspect 
noticeably lacking in the literature examined, and the stakeholder discussions held. If key 
engineering decisions are being made with a reliance on information stored in and derived from 
MBSE models, this surely is an important consideration. 
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7 Recommendations 
Based on what the information gathered in this effort there are a number of 
recommendations that can be made. 
Continue with OSMA Objective Hierarchy efforts 
These will help codify the objectives at the Agency level, allowing Center/Mission tailoring as 
appropriate.  This will also encourage foundational-level ontology elements, and possibly 
discipline-level, to be consistent across the agency.  This will greatly facilitate cross Agency 
communication, sharing and reviews.  Currently, a handful of the Objective Hierarchies (out of 
an anticipated total of more than 20) have been completely generated.   These should be 
integrated into a single over-arching hierarchy, paving the way for the remainder, as they are 
developed, to also be fit within this over-arching OSMA hierarchy. 
Encourage/motivate Center-wide and NASA-wide efforts 
Many of the Centers have a number of efforts with varying maturity ongoing.  Few of these 
efforts are aware of efforts at other Centers. Even within a Center, efforts may be only vaguely 
aware of other efforts at their Center.  JPL has instituted Integrated Model-Centric Engineering 
(IMCE) whose function is to develop foundation-level ontologies, assist in the development of 
discipline-level ontologies and support mission level applications.  IMCE greatly enables 
progress at JPL by integrating previously disparate efforts, engaging stakeholders, and 
producing results as they went along.  GSFC has also begun the process of piloting MBSE 
following an initial education/familiarization process. 
Support collaborations 
Many of the current efforts are pilots, and as such may not have the necessary resources to 
include elements beyond their immediate focus. It is especially hard for pilots to span the entire 
lifecycle of a mission, and thus hard for them to reveal the benefits of early lifecycle activities 
reflected later in the lifecycle.  OSMA should encourage collaborations between its own 
researchers and practitioners and those of programs and projects.  As our literature search 
clearly identified, there are a large number of efforts upon which OSMA can “piggyback”.  Even 
without an over-arching program, there should be motivation for cooperation between OSMA 
disciplines.  For example, the consolidation of the Objective Hierarchies discussed above. 
For fostering of inter-center collaboration and coordination, organizational structures that 
span the Centers (OSMA of course; also NESC) could play a key role. This could be in the form 
of workshops and other TIGs to allow sharing of results and promising directions.  
Establish a Program 
The creation of a specific MBMA Program will accomplish a number of objectives.  It will 
provide an indication to practitioners and other stakeholders that OSMA is serious about reaping 
the benefits.  It will provide a central place where proposals can be evaluated, collaborations 
can be fostered and results can be shared across a broader community. 
Have a portfolio 
There should be a portfolio of efforts spanning near- mid- and long-term payoffs. 
It is important that some efforts focus on immediate products since “buy in” comes more 
quickly when users realize that the output products (artifacts) they get in an MBSE setting can 
look the same and contain the same information (or more) as before. However, there is the 
need to be cautious about too much “low hanging fruit” as quick hits may become overly 
wedded to existing capabilities (e.g., the current form of ontology), and their dependence on 
these may be impediment to future changes. 
To compensate, there should also be efforts focused on medium- and long-term problems. 
For example, the integration of MBSE with problem reporting and inspection reporting systems 
could be a desirable medium-term pursuit, while the incorporation of risk into the space systems 
engineering ontology would be a long-term pursuit of obvious interest to Mission Assurance. 
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There should also be a portfolio of mission types and development phases to which MBSE 
is applied. To some extent this is already taking place. At JPL the primary application of MBSE 
is to the Europa Clipper pre-project, which is a large-scale project in its early stages of 
formulation. Meanwhile, the MBSE activities reported in [Selvy et al., 2014] were focused on the 
verification planning phases for the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope.  At the other end of the 
spectrum in terms of scale, INCOSE efforts have focused on CubeSats as an exemplary target 
for MBSE. CubeSats are appealing because their development proceeds at a relatively fast 
pace, hence they may become the first applications of MBSE to span the entire lifecycle from 
conception to operation. However, their very limited budgets offer very little scope for 
prototyping of MBSE – augmenting their funding would be needed to permit such studies.  
Another avenue of pursuit is to retrospectively demonstrate MBSE on elements of a 
previously completed mission. This allows comparisons of the quality of the artifacts that MBSE 
is able to produce to those that were produced by traditional development means. An instance 
of this is taking place at JPL, where the FMECA generated in the course of developing a 
previous mission is being retrospectively generated using MBSE-based technology. Of course 
this kind of study is of no help to the previously completed mission, so can only be justified as 
an activity to further understanding and evaluation of MBSE. 
Address what’s key but missing 
The MBSE literature examined had almost nothing to say about risk. Yet risk permeates the 
practice of mission assurance It plays a key role in and around the Risk Informed Safety Case 
featured in NASA’s System Safety framework [NASA, 2011]. 
Also note that Section 2.3 “Developing an ontology for space systems engineering” cited risk 
into as an especially cross-cutting concept yet to be incorporated into a space systems 
engineering ontology. 
In summary 
MBSE holds great promise as a means to improve upon many, perhaps all, aspects of 
NASA missions’ systems engineering practices. MBSE shows every indication of being here to 
stay – it is not a “passing fad.” It is also progressing rapidly, and the time is ripe for S&MA to 
become intimately involved.  
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Appendixes 
A. Stakeholder Interviews 
As technologies and new approaches emerge, there is a predictable pattern of local pockets 
of early adoption which grow and eventually become the new norm.  NASA has such an 
innovative culture that inevitably some of its local pockets of early adopters of MBSE are 
unaware of each other.  The stakeholder surveys we performed were an important part of this 
MBMA roadmapping effort.  We wanted to accomplish two things: 
 Discover ideas, concerns and opportunities from those interviewed (stakeholders) 
 Share ongoing ideas and efforts identified by the literature search. 
Thus, our intention was to both learn and teach. Often, fear of new ideas is a result of 
misunderstandings about the new idea. 
Survey Question areas: 
 Questions about familiarity with MBSE 








 Questions about priorities for solving problems 
 Questions about MSBE features of interest 
We interviewed people from NASA OSMA, various MA disciplines, and in particular those 
doing applications of MBSE with awareness of MA.  The surveys were kept informal, and 
comments were made in anonymity as the goal was to extract real concerns and opportunities. 
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Sue Aleman (NASA OSMA) 1    1  
Genji Arakaki (JPL MA: Europa MAM)  1    1 
Todd Bayer (JPL: Principal System Engineer)      1 
Brian Cox (JPL: SE)      1 
Chrishma Derewa (JPL: Europa SE)     1 1 
Homayoon Dezfuli (NASA OSMA) 1    1  
Dan Dvorak (JPL: IMCE)    1   
George Greanias (JPL MA: MAM, Environmental 
Requirements) 
 1 1  1  
Chester Everline (JPL MA: PRA, Reliability)  1 1    
Frank Groen (NASA OSMA) 1      
Jairus Hihn (JPL: Early phase Cost and Risk 
modeling) 
     1 
Steve Jenkins (JPL: IMCE Technical Lead)    1  1 
Kin Man (JPL MA: Environmental Requirements)  1     
Anthony Mittskus (JPL MA: RM)  1     
Tracy Neilson (JPL: Fault Protection Engineer)      1 
Jeffrey Nunes (JPL MA: Reliability)  1 1    
Bob Rasmussen (JPL: Engineering Fellow)      1 
Kris Romig (GSFC)      1 
Jessica Samuels (JPL MBSE: V&V Application)    1  1 
Harald Schone (JPL MA: Technologist)  1     
Doug Sheldon (JPL MA: Technology Program 
Manager) 
 1     
Marc Sarrel (JPL: SE)      1 
Martha Wetherholt (NASA OSMA) 1    1  
 





B. The Reliability and Maintainability Objectives Hierarchy 
The five images of this subsection are taken from: 
https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-source/News-Documents/r-amp-m-
hierarchy.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
The page that introduces this and other of OSMA’s objectives-based strategies is: 
https://sma.nasa.gov/news/articles/newsitem/2014/12/04/osma-introduces-new-objectives-
based-strategies Unlimited distribution of Government document; no re-use statement required. 
The five images that follow are: 
 R&M Objectives Hierarchy – Top Level  
 R&M Hierarchy Sub – Obj. 1  
 R&M Hierarchy Sub – Obj. 2 
 R&M Hierarchy Sub – Obj. 3 

















AADL Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language 
ASARP As Safe As Reasonably 
Practicable 
BDD Block Definition Diagram [of 
SysML] 
C&DH Command and Data Handling 
CDD Capability Definition Document 
CM Configuration Management 
CONOP Concept of Operations 
EHM Europa Habitability Mission 
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle 
FFBD Functional Flow Block Diagram 
FFMEA Functional Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis 
FSM Finite State Machine 
FSW Flight Software 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GSDO Ground Systems Development and 
Operations 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation 
GRC Glenn Research Center 
HQA Hardware Quality Assurance 
HW Hardware 
KDP Key Decision Point  
I&T Integration and Test 
I/O Input/Output 
IBD Internal Block Diagram [of SysML] 
ICAM Integrated Computer Aided 
Manufacturing 
ICD Interface Control Document 
ICOM Inputs, Control, Outputs and 
Mechanisms 
IDEF0 ICAM Definition for Function 
Modeling 
IMCE Integrated Model-Centric 
Engineering 
INCOSE International Council on Systems 
Engineering 
ISS International Space Station 
IT Information Technology 
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KDP Key Decision Point 
LADEE Lunar Atmosphere and Dust 
Environment Explorer 
LSST Large Synoptic Survey Telescope 
MA Mission Assurance 
MAM Mission Assurance Manager 
MBMA Model-Based Mission Assurance 
MBSE  Model-Based Systems Engineering 
MEL Mass Equipment List 
MISSE-X Materials on ISS Experiment-X 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety 
Center 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 
OMG Object Management Group 
OSMA Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance 
OWL Web Ontology Language 
PD Parametric Diagram [of SysML] 
PDMS Product Data Management 
Systems 
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
QA Quality Assurance 
R&M Reliability and Maintainability 
RISC Risk Informed Safety Case 
RM Risk Management 
SBIR Small Business Innovation 
Research 
SE Systems Engineering / Systems 
Engineer 
SD Sequence Diagram [of SysML] 
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SSWG Space Systems Working Group [of 
INCOSE] 
SW Software 
SysML™ Systems Modeling Language 
TIG Technical Interest Group 
UML Unified Modeling Language 
V&V Verification and Validation
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